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BEYOND TECHNOPHOBIA: LAWYERS’ ETHICAL AND LEGAL 
OBLIGATIONS TO MONITOR EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY AND 
SECURITY RISKS 
 
Timothy J. Toohey
* 
 
Cite as: Timothy J. Toohey, Beyond Technophobia: Lawyers’ Ethical and 
Legal Obligations to Monitor Evolving Technology and Security Risks, 21 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (2015), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i3/article9.pdf. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Lawyers and technology have an uneasy relationship.  Although 
some lawyers are early adapters, others take pride in ignoring technology 
because they believe it is alien to the practice of law.  As Jody R. Westby 
observed, lawyers confronted with technology and security issues tend to 
have their “eyes glaze over” and “want to call in their ‘IT guy’ and go 
back to work.”1  But this technophobic attitude may no longer just be 
harmless conservatism.  In the world of growing security risks, ignorance 
of technology may lead to violations of lawyers’ fundamental ethical 
duties of competence and confidentiality. 
 
[2] As with other businesses, lawyers are part of a constantly evolving 
and interconnected data ecosystem.  The pervasiveness of electronic data 
in all aspects of commercial and personal life and its easy transmission 
through the Internet have not only fundamentally altered the manner in 
which lawyers interact with clients and with one another, but potentially 
expose confidential and proprietary information to rapid and unauthorized 
dissemination.  As vast amounts of data are created and stored, 
                                                             
*
 Partner, Head of Cyber, Privacy and Data Security Practice at Morris Polich & Purdy, 
Los Angeles, California; Certified Information Privacy Professional United States and 
European Union (CIPP/US/E); Certified Information Privacy Manager (CIPM). 
 
1
 Jody R. Westby, Cybersecurity & Law Firms: A Business Risk, 39 L. PRACTICE MAG. 4, 
46 (July–Aug. 2013), available at 
http://www.lawpracticemagazine.com/lawpracticemagazine/july_august_2013#pg1,  
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confidential data—including attorney-client communications—can be 
readily transferred or accessed by unauthorized parties.  With rapidly 
changing technology and threat vectors, lawyers are increasingly 
challenged in maintaining the security of their information and that of 
their clients.  
 
[3] Rapid technological change has been a constant for the practice of 
law for at least a generation.  E-mail, which in the early 1990s was not 
widely used in the profession, is now the main form of communication 
within law firms, as well as with counsel and clients outside the firm.  
Despite the growth of text messaging, e-mail continues to expand as a 
means of business communication.  In 2011 there were on average 105 e-
mails sent or received by corporate users per day, and it is predicted that 
this will increase to 125 e-mails per day by 2015.
2
  While in 2011 there 
were over 3.1 billion e-mail accounts (of which 788 million were 
corporate), it is predicted that in 2015 there will be four billion accounts 
(of which over one billion would be corporate).
3
 
 
[4] The use of the Internet, which impacts almost every aspect of the 
practice of law, has also grown substantially in the last twenty years.  In 
1995 there were sixteen million users worldwide, in 2005 over a billion, 
and as of June 2014 it is estimated that there are over three billion users.
4
  
In the past, lawyers used their own in-house computing resources.  But 
now, facilitated by the Internet, lawyers frequently use remote 
provisioning of computing and storage services known as “cloud 
computing.”  It is predicted the future will show a 44% annual growth in 
                                                             
archived at http://perma.cc/VBR2-2RAM. 
 
2
 See SARA RADICATI & QUOC HOANG, EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2011-2015 3 (2011), 
available at http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Email-Statistics-
Report-2011-2015-Executive-Summary.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2SLA-4CD8.   
 
3
 See id. at 2–3. 
 
4
 See Internet Growth Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2014 archived 
at http://perma.cc/27N9-68YE. 
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public cloud workloads, in comparison to an 8.9% annual growth for 
computing services located in the premises of businesses.
5
  In 2014 it was 
estimated that there was one exabatye (i.e., 10
18
 bytes of data) stored in the 
cloud, and CISCO predicts data center traffic will triple by 2017.
6
 
 
[5] This article argues that because of the evolving security risks 
brought by the changes wrought by e-mail, the Internet, and cloud 
computing, lawyers must reassess their ethical duties of competence and 
confidentiality.  Although lawyers may have been comforted by ethical 
opinions finding the use of e-mail or cloud computing appropriate in the 
past, they can no longer rely on those opinions given dramatically altered 
security risks. 
 
[6] This article also argues that lawyers must develop a greater 
awareness of the risks posed by the technology than they have had in the 
past because—like their clients—they are subject to rapidly escalating 
security threats.  Whether they are aware of it or not, lawyers and law 
firms are increasingly the target of sophisticated hackers who deliberately 
seek out the confidential information they store on behalf of clients.
7
  
Although lawyers should not (and, indeed, cannot) abandon e-mail and 
cloud computing, they must shoulder greater responsibility in protecting 
data against evolving security risks.  Lawyers must take concrete steps to 
protect data which they store for themselves and their clients, including 
developing risk management and incident response programs to prepare 
for cyberattacks and the consequences of such attacks.  As with their 
corporate counterparts, security and privacy are no longer a matter for 
                                                             
5
 See Jack Woods, 20 Cloud Computing Statistics Every CIO Should Know, 
SILICONANGLE (Jan. 27, 2014), http://siliconangle.com/blog/2014/01/27/20-cloud-
computing-statistics-tc0114/, archived at http://perma.cc/GVQ2-MHRR.  
 
6
 See id. 
 
7
 See, e.g., Andrew Conte, Unprepared Law Firms Vulnerable to Hackers, TRIBLIVE 
(Sept. 13, 2014, 10:40 PM), http://triblive.com/news/allegheny/6721544-74/law-firms-
information#axzz3S2IsKaPf, archived at http://perma.cc/9DUR-HQXF (stating that 
computer hackers are targeting top international law firms to steal intellectual property 
data and trade secrets). 
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specialists, but for all who deal with private, proprietary, and confidential 
data—including lawyers.8   
 
II.  LAWYERS AND TECHNOPHOBIA 
 
[7] Although it is unlikely there will ever be a comprehensive study of 
the subject, a portion of the legal profession—if not outright Luddites—
are uncomfortable with technology and consider an understanding of its 
workings to be unnecessary—if not inimical—to the practice of law.9  In a 
1963 article on “Lawyers and Machines,” Colin Tapper observed that 
“[l]awyers are traditionally conservative” and resistant to change, 
including when it comes to adopting machines for their work.
10
  Tapper 
presciently suggested what we would now call computerized databases 
could be useful in the practice of law, but feared that lawyers may be slow 
to accept such tools.
11
  Although Tapper believed technology had brought 
                                                             
8
 See, e.g., Richard Blackwell, C-Suite Survey: Cybersecurity Becomes A Top Priority 
After Data Breaches, BUS. NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 20, 2014, 10:09 AM), 
http://www.bnn.ca/News/2014/10/20/C-Suite-Survey-Cybersecurity-becomes-a-top-
priority-after-data-breaches.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/Y4X7-WPHP; see also 
JODY R. WESTBY, GOVERNANCE OF ENTERPRISE SECURITY: CYLAB 2012 REPORT: HOW 
BOARDS & SENIOR EXECUTIVES ARE MANAGING CYBER RISKS 5–6 (2012), available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CYBER%20Carneigie%20Mellon%20repor
t.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3CXW-4QKM (reporting that boards of directors are 
still “not actively addressing cyber risk management”). 
 
9
 See Maureen O’Neill, Lawyers Must Conquer Technophobia to Provide Competent 
Counsel, DISCOVER READY (May 24, 2012), http://discoverready.com/blog/lawyers-
must-conquer-technophobia-to-provide-competent-counsel/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/92TG-NLT5; see also Mitch Kowalski, New Legal Tech Audit Will Scare 
Lawyers into Embracing Technology, LEGAL POST, (Aug. 29, 2014, 2:12 PM), 
http://business.financialpost.com/2014/08/29/new-legal-tech-audit-will-scare-lawyers-
into-embracing-technology/, archived at http://perma.cc/U46T-3V35 (“Lawyers have 
traditionally revelled in their technophobia—much to their client's chagrin.”); Kenneth N. 
Rashbaum et al., Cybersecurity: Business Imperative for Law Firms, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 10, 
2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202678493487/Cybersecurity-Business-
Imperative-for-Law-Firms, archived at http://perma.cc/2GVN-4XFT (referencing the 
“reputed technophobia of many lawyers”). 
 
10
 See Colin Tapper, Lawyers and Machines, 26 MOD. L. REV. 121, 122 (1963). 
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improvements, including the use of the Dictaphone, he noted that as late as 
the 1960s the Chancery Division of the English law courts resisted using 
“typewriters, the postal service and telephones.”12 
 
[8] Like their English counterparts, some U.S. lawyers have 
historically been resistant to adopting new technology.  When future U.S. 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles joined Sullivan & Cromwell in 1911, 
telephones and stenographers were not widely accepted and some 
“partners felt that the only dignified way of communication between 
members of the legal profession was for them to write each other in 
Spencerian script,
13
 and to have the message thus expressed [sic] delivered 
by hand.” 14   Clarence Seward, the managing partner of what would 
become Cravath, Swaine & Moore “‘sought in vain to save the office from 
the machine [including elevators and typewriters], which was destroying 
the simplicity of American life.’”15 
 
[9] Notwithstanding initial resistance, the U.S. legal profession 
eventually embraced elevators, typewriters and Dictaphones—as it would 
later adopt the Telex, copiers, fax machines, personal computers, 
                                                                                                                                                       
11
 See id. 
 
12
 Id. at 122 n. 1. 
 
13
 Spencerian script was a “script style that was used in the United States from 
approximately 1850 to 1925 and was considered the American de facto standard writing 
style for business correspondence prior to the widespread adoption of the typewriter.”  
Spencerian Script, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spencerian_script, archived 
at https://perma.cc/2FHM (last modified June 24, 2014, 12:59 PM). 
 
14
 Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the 
Promise, 49 DUKE L. J. 147, 164 (1999) (quoting John Foster Dulles, Foreword to 
ARTHUR H. DEAN, WILLIAM NELSON CROMWELL 1854–1984, at iii (1957)).    
 
15
 Id. at 165 (quoting ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 
1819-1947, at 448 (1946)).  Lanctot writes that “[i]n a story so telling that it can only be 
apocryphal, one colleague described the time that Seward refused to take an elevator up 
four flights to a hearing in federal court and insisted instead on walking.  When he finally 
arrived at the courtroom, Seward was reportedly so out of breath that the argument had to 
be cancelled and the case submitted on the briefs.”  Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 3 
 
 6 
electronic mail, mobile phones, and electronic research databases.
16
  
Today’s lawyers are unlikely to reject technology outright, because that 
would render them virtually incapable of communicating with one another 
and their clients and practicing law.  Nonetheless, a substantial number of 
lawyers exhibit a sometimes studied indifference to technology, believing 
it to be either irrelevant to the practice of law or the purview of non-
lawyersincluding the IT department.17   
 
III.  SECURITY RISKS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
 
[10] Given their unsettled relationship with technology, lawyers have 
been slow to recognize that hackers have lawyers in their sights as a 
potentially easy target.  Lawyers who “have a hard enough time just 
figuring out how to work their BlackBerry or iPhone” 18  may have 
difficulty understanding that they are “basically the same as any other 
company when it comes to countering cyberattacks and protecting their 
confidential and proprietary data.” 19   But, in fact, lawyers have been 
warned for at least the last five years that they are susceptible to 
cyberattacks because of the substantial amounts of data they safeguard for 
themselves and their clients.
20
 
                                                             
16
 See Robert Ambrogi, A Chronology of Legal Technology, 1842–1995, L. SITES (Feb. 
14, 2010), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2010/02/chronology-of-legal-technology-
1842.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NU4C-NFVX; see also Nicole Black, 10 
Technologies That Changed the Practice of Law, MYCASE (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.mycase.com/blog/2014/07/10-technologies-changed-practice-law/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/SRT5-A6QS. 
 
17
 See Westby, supra note 1, at 46–47. 
 
18
 Jennifer Smith, Lawyers Get Vigilant on Cybersecurity, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2012, 
available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577486761101726748, 
archived at http://perma.cc/2V83-AP92. 
 
19
 Westby, supra note 1, at 46. 
 
20
 See Michael Cooney, FBI Warns of Spear Phishing Attacks on Lawyers, PR Firms, 
NETWORKWORLD (Nov. 18, 2009, 3:20 PM), 
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[11] As cyberattacks have grown in number, so has the exposure of the 
legal profession to such attacks.  In the last two years, cyberattacks on 
U.S. enterprises have been constantly in the news.  2014 has been 
proclaimed the “year of the data breach” because of the well-publicized 
attacks on Target, Home Depot, Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE), and 
numerous other businesses.
21
  Even before the SPE breach in November 
2014, Forrester Research predicted that “[a]t least 60% of brands will 
discover a breach of sensitive data in 2015, with the actual number of 
breached entities being as high as 80% or more . . . .”22   
 
[12] The Verizon 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report, which is 
based on reported events from 2013, referenced 63,437 reported security 
incidents and 1,367 breaches in almost every economic sector.
23
  Of 
interest to lawyers is the fact that the Verizon Report found that attacks on 
“professionals” have grown significantly in recent years with only the 
public sector, finance and retail having more security incidents than 
professionals in 2013.
24
   
 
[13] The primary attack vectors for professionals include “denial of 
service” (DoS) attacks and cyber espionage. 25   DoS attacks typically 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2232563/security/fbi-warns-of-spear-phishing-
attacks-on-lawyers--pr-firms.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HDV5-4LXZ.  
 
21
 See Tom Huddleston, Jr., The Sony Hack Should Make Cyber Security a Hot 
Boardroom Topic, FORTUNE (Dec. 23, 2014, 1:55 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2014/12/23/sony-hack-security-boardroom/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/R62B-NEUF.   
 
22
 60% of Brands Will Discover a Breach of Sensitive Data in 2015, FORRESTER (Nov. 
12, 2014), 
https://www.forrester.com/60+Of+Brands+Will+Discover+A+Breach+Of+Sensitive+Dat
a+In+2015/-/E-PRE7425, archived at https://perma.cc/C9S6-A88J.   
 
23
 See VERIZON, 2014 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2 (2014), available at 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2014/, archived at http://perma.cc/B2KR-4LT9.   
 
24
 See id. at 15. 
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compromise the availability of networks and systems through network and 
computer applications.
26
  DoS attacks may be launched by either 
individuals or entities, including foreign governments, competitors and 
disgruntled employees.  The aim of a DoS attack is to slow or shut down 
legitimate traffic to the victim’s website.27  Almost any type of business 
may be subject to a DoS attack and such attacks may be launched for a 
wide variety of reasons, including shutting down a controversial project, 
preventing access to financial or other key services, gaining publicity for a 
cause, or benefiting a foreign government or competitor.
28
   
 
[14] Another major source of attacks against professionals is cyber 
espionage, in which state-affiliated actors, particularly from Asia and 
Eastern Europe, target enterprises to obtain information of competitive or 
strategic value.
29
  Cyber espionage attacks are often conducted through 
malware implanted on computer systems by way of a social engineering 
attack, such as “spear-phishing” e-mails.30  In a targeted attack, the user 
                                                                                                                                                       
25
 See id. 
 
26
 See id. at 43–45.  
 
27
 See TIMOTHY J. TOOHEY, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY TRENDS AND DESIGN 
PROFESSIONALS 1–2 (Morris Polich & Purdy 2014) [hereinafter PRIVACY AND DATA 
SECURITY TRENDS AND DESIGN PROFESSIONALS], available at 
http://www.mpplaw.com/files/Publication/c76f880b-a26b-4d33-91eb-
e629890feeca/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/de6cbf28-77b2-4389-ad01-
e6a0f3a741eb/DR-Privacy-and-Data-Security-Trends-and-Design-Professionals-TJT-
June-2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WKC2-JNDX.   
 
28
 See id. at 2; see also Bob Tarzey, Why Would They DoS Us?, COMPUTERWEEKLY 
(Feb. 10, 2014, 7:54 AM), http://www.computerweekly.com/cgi-bin/mt-
search.cgi?blog_id=119&tag=Denial-of-service%20attack&limit=20, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XYS6-KARF.  
 
29
 See, e.g., PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY TRENDS AND DESIGN PROFESSIONALS, supra 
note 27, at 2. 
 
30
 See Pieter Danhieux, Email Phishing Attacks, OUCH! (Sans Institute), Feb. 2013, at 1, 
available at http://www.securingthehuman.org/newsletters/ouch/issues/OUCH-
201302_en.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M3WW-MCVD. 
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typically receives a seemingly bona fide e-mail from what appears to be a 
colleague which in fact comes from a hostile party.
31
  When the recipient 
clicks on an executable file in the e-mail, malware is launched that is 
implanted into the recipient’s computer system.32 
 
[15] Although some of the details are unclear, the massive breach 
against SPE’s computer systems in November and December 2014 is in 
key respects akin to a cyber espionage attack.  Using malware with the 
capability to, among other things, access files stored on a computer 
system, the hackers mounted an attack on SPE that created backdoor 
access to the system, destroyed and “clean[ed]” computer systems, and 
paralyzed the company’s computer systems for weeks. 33   The attack, 
which the U.S. attributes to North Korea, arose in conjunction with the 
James Franco and Seth Rogen film The Interview which featured a 
fictional plot to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
34
  The 
attack rendered SPE’s computer system inaccessible, and significant 
amounts of sensitive and proprietary data were exfiltrated from its 
system.
35
  The attack also resulted in the release and public distribution of 
                                                             
31
 See id.  
 
32
 See id. at 1–2. 
 
33
 See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Sony Breach May Have Exposed Employee Healthcare, Salary 
Data, KREBS ON SECURITY (Dec. 2, 2014, 11:21 AM), 
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/12/sony-breach-may-have-exposed-employee-
healthcare-salary-data/, archived at http://perma.cc/3TNS-RC67; see also Alert (TA14-
353A): Targeted Destructive Malware, U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM 
(Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-353A, archived at 
https://perma.cc/KB5E-29AR (analyzing malware used to attack SPE). 
 
34
 See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Michael S. Schmidt, More Sanctions on North Korea 
After Sony Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2015, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/03/us/in-response-to-sony-attack-us-levies-sanctions-
on-10-north-koreans.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4QVA-NPKE. 
 
35
 See Ben Fritz and Danny Yadron, Sony Hack Exposed Personal Data of Hollywood 
Stars, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2014, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/sony-pictures-
hack-reveals-more-data-than-previously-believed-1417734425 archived at 
http://perma.cc/6UHK-RQBY.  
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sensitive attorney-client communications, including materials relating to 
labor matters handled by a prominent U.S. law firm, e-mails from SPE 
executives, and 47,000 social security numbers of current and former SPE 
employees, including actors and directors.
36
  
 
[16] Social engineering attacks are not limited to those engaging in 
cyber espionage.  For example, in the 2013 Target hack, a social 
engineering attack against one of Target’s vendors launched malware that 
allowed cyber criminals in Eastern Europe to obtain credit card 
information from Target’s customers at the point of sale (POS).37  The 
malware lurked on Target’s system for weeks and automatically sent 
credit card information for 70–110 million individuals to the hackers.38 
 
[17] Cyber espionage attacks are particularly difficult to detect.  The 
Verizon 2013 Report found that 62% of the attacks took months to 
discover and 5% of attacks took years to detect.
39
  Aside from the SPE 
attack, which appears to have been motivated less by economic than 
political motives, attacks are typically launched by foreign nation states to 
obtain information to allow them to gain advantage for a particular project.  
For example, in May 2014 the U.S. Department of Justice announced it 
had charged Chinese military hackers with cyber espionage aimed at 
                                                             
36
 See id.; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Sony Pictures Hires David Boies, Who Warns 
Media to Destroy Documents Leaked by Hackers, ABA Journal (Dec. 15, 2014 11:38 
AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/sony_pictures_hires_david_boies_who_warns_
media_to_destroy_hacked_documents, archived at http://perma.cc/33FK-8XBZ.   
 
37
 See Brian Krebs, Target Hackers Broke in Via HVAC Company, KREBS ON SECURITY 
(Feb. 5, 2014, 1:52 PM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/02/target-hackers-broke-in-via-
hvac-company/, archived at http://perma.cc/F2JR-9ZYE.   
 
38
 See Elizabeth A. Harris and Nicole Perlroth, For Target, The Breach Numbers Grow, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/target-breach-affected-70-million-
customers.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/GH83-UUQD.   
 
39
 See VERIZON, supra note 23, at 41. 
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obtaining “confidential and proprietary technical and design 
specifications” from several U.S. companies, including Westinghouse, to 
advantage Chinese state-owned enterprises.
40
  
 
[18] Law firms are far from immune to security attacks, including DoS 
and cyber espionage attacks.
41
  In its August 2014 cybersecurity 
resolution, the ABA found that “[t]he threat of cyber attacks against law 
firms is growing” and that “[l]awyers and law firms are facing 
unprecedented challenges from the widespread use of electronic records 
and mobile devices.”42  Lawyers and law firms are targets because “[t]hey 
collect and store large amounts of critical, highly valuable corporate 
records, including intellectual property, strategic business data, and 
litigation-related theories and records collected through e-[D]iscovery.”43  
As a former FBI agent has observed, law firms are vulnerable to attack 
because they “‘have incredibly valuable and sensitive information, and the 
Internet just provides a whole other methodology through which the 
information can be accessed and pilfered.’”44  Lawyers may also be targets 
                                                             
40
 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers 
for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for 
Commercial Advantage (May 19, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-
charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-
labor, archived at http://perma.cc/XYJ8-DQJX. 
 
41
 See Rashbaum et al., supra note 9.   
 
42
 JUDITH MILLER AND HARVEY RISHIKOF, ABA, CYBERSECURITY LEGAL TASK FORCE 
SECTION OF SCIENCE & TECH. LAW REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (2014), 
available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/law_national_security/2014annualm
eeting/ABA%20-%20Cyber%20Resolution%20109%20Final.authcheckdam.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ACE4-GAKC; see also American Bar Association House of 
Delegates Adopts Resolutions on Cybersecurity, Domestic Violence, ABA (Aug. 12, 
2014), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-
archives/2014/08/american_bar_associa.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G9AL-8T9N.  
 
43
 MILLER AND RISHIKOF, supra note 42, at 4.   
 
44
 Smith, supra note 18 (quoting Shawn Henry, a “FBI veteran former executive assistant 
director of the agency's criminal, cyber, response and services branch.”). 
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of attacks because “it is generally easier for a hacker to break into a law 
firm’s network to steal client data than it is to hack into the clients’ 
networks to steal the data.”45 
 
[19] Few law firm hacks have been publicized, most likely because the 
firms are reluctant publicly to expose their vulnerability and may not 
legally be required to inform the public of hacks.
46
  However, it has been 
reported that an unnamed “major New York law firm” was attacked in 
2012 by Chinese hackers seeking information about a business deal.
47
  
When this hack was announced, the FBI “convened a meeting with the top 
200 New York City law firms to address the rising number of cyberattacks 
on law firms.”48  The FBI reportedly warned lawyers at the meeting “that 
they were easy prey for hackers trying to obtain their clients’ valuable 
data.”49  Law firms were an “easy target,” according to the FBI, because 
“partners insist on mobility—including the ability to review case 
documents at home on the weekend or while travelling—which means 
highly sensitive documents are routinely transferred by e-mail, leaving 
them vulnerable to attack.”50  The FBI informed lawyers at the meeting 
that it had “‘seen specific documents from law firms on specific deals 
being exfiltrated from cyberattacks.’”51 
                                                             
45
 Lynn Watson, At the Crossroads of Lawyering and Technology: Ethics, PRACTICE 
INNOVATIONS, July 2012, at 17, 18, available at 
http://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/signup/newsletters/practice-
innovations/2013-jan/Jan13_PracticeInnovations.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H67Z-
NE5F. 
 
46
 See Conte, supra note 7.  
 
47
 See Mike Mintz, Cyberattacks on Law Firms-A Growing Threat, MARTINDALE.COM 
BLOG (Mar. 19, 2012), http://blog.martindale.com/cyberattacks-on-law-firms-a-growing-
threat, archived at http://perma.cc/H67Z-NE5F.   
 
48
 Id. 
 
49
 Id. 
 
50
 Id.  
 
51
 Smith, supra note 18 (quoting Mary Gallian of the FBI). 
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[20] Documents held by law firms are of undoubted interest to hackers.  
In some instances, documents originating from law firms have been 
exposed when hackers attack a firm’s clients.  For example, in the recent 
SPE attack, documents originating from a prominent labor and 
employment firm were published on the Internet, including documents that 
apparently contained details regarding termination of employees.
52
  In 
another attack said to have been launched by Wikileaks in retaliation for 
the claim of a security firm that boasted it could identify individuals 
belonging to that hacktivist organization, documents were put on line from 
a national law firm relating to representation of clients such as Bank of 
America and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
53
  
 
IV.  LAWYERS’ LEGAL AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS TO SECURE DATA 
 
[21] In common with other enterprises, lawyers are legally required to 
secure personal data they hold on behalf of others and for themselves.  In 
addition to being obligated to secure personal data, lawyers are also 
ethically bound as professionals to maintain the confidentiality of client 
documents and communications, which is a much broader category than 
“personal” information.   
 
A.  Lawyers’ Legal Obligations to Secure Data 
 
[22] Federal and state laws impose legal obligations on law firms, like 
other enterprises, to implement “reasonable” security measures to protect 
data that they store on behalf of themselves and others.  These laws also 
require enterprises to report any breaches in the security of personal data. 
 
[23] For example, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81 requires businesses to take 
                                                             
52
 See Krebs, supra note 33 (showing screen shot of file tree including references to law 
firm and employee data).  
 
53
 See Brian Baxter, Hunton & Williams Linked to Hacked E-Mail Affair, AMLAW DAILY 
(Feb. 15, 2011, 11:11 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/02/hunton-
wikileaks.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7RKU-V6LG.   
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“reasonable steps to dispose, or arrange for the destruction of customer 
records within its custody or control containing personal information.”54  
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5 also requires businesses that “own” or 
“license” personal information about a California resident to “implement 
and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to 
the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from 
unauthorized access, destruction, use modification, or disclosure.”55  As of 
January 1, 2015, California will also require businesses that “maintain” 
information on behalf of others to implement such security measures, for 
“information that a business maintains but does not own or license.”56 
 
[24] California and forty-seven other states require persons and 
businesses, including lawyers, to notify residents regarding breaches of 
unencrypted personal information.
57
  In California, which has led the way 
in such data breach notification laws, “personal information” includes (1) 
an individual’s first name or first initial and last name in combination with 
a social security number, a driver’s license or identification card number, 
an account number, credit or debit card number in combination with a 
                                                             
54
 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81 (Deering 2005).  The statute further requires that records 
are to be shredded or erased or that the personal information in the records should be 
made “unreadable or undecipherable through any means.” 
 
55
 Id. at § 1798.81.5. 
 
56
 See A.B. 1710, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014)., available at 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB1710, 
archived at http://perma.cc/HL69-CJDV; see also Timothy J. Toohey, California 
Modifies Its Data Breach Notification Requirements Again, MORRIS POLICH & PURDY 
(Oct. 3, 2014) [hereinafter California Modifies Its Data Breach Notification 
Requirements Again], http://privacydatasecurity.com/CA-Modifies-Data-Breach-
Notification-AB-1710-TJT-10'3'14.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SK3S-8LGD.   
 
57
 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (Deering 2005).  A list of the data breach laws is 
maintained by the National Conference of State Legislatures.  See Security Breach 
Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-
breach-notification-laws.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/V9JZ-UYJZ (maintaining a list 
of data breach laws).   
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required security code, access code or password, medical information, or 
health insurance information or (2) a user name and e-mail address in 
combination with a password or security question and answer that would 
permit access to an online account.
58
  Moreover, if the personal 
information that is breached is not owned by the person or business that 
was breached, they must “notify the owner or licensee of the information 
of any breach of the security of the data immediately following discovery, 
if the personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, 
acquired by an unauthorized person.”59  Failures of businesses, including 
law firms, to maintain appropriate security or to comply with data breach 
notification laws, may subject them to fines and/or lawsuits for damages.
60
  
 
[25] Federal authorities may also penalize businesses that do not 
maintain appropriate security measures.  For example, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has broad authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act
61
 
to bring actions against enterprises that do not maintain “reasonable and 
appropriate data security for consumers’ sensitive personal information.”62  
                                                             
58
 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(e).   
 
59
 Id. at § 1798.82(b). 
 
60
 See id. at § 1798.84.  For example, the California Attorney General brought an action 
against Kaiser Foundation Health Plan alleging that the disclosure of a breach was 
unreasonably delayed when personal data was found in a hard drive being sold at a thrift 
store.  See Ronald W. Breaux, Emily Westridge Black, and Timothy Newman, California 
AG Cracks Down on Timing of Data Breach Disclosures, HAYNES BOONE (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://www.haynesboone.com/california-ag-cracks-down-on-timing-of-data-breach-
disclosures-02-04-2014/, archived at http://perma.cc/M8CK-KCWA.  Kaiser settled the 
matter for $150,000.00.  Id.  
 
61
 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) & (2) (2012).  The Act declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce . . . .”  Id.  The FTC's enforcement generally proceeds under either 
the “unfairness” prong which focuses on consumer injury or the “deception” prong which 
focuses on “[a] representation, omission, or practice [which] misleads or is likely to 
mislead the consumer.”  See TIMOTHY J. TOOHEY, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY AND DATA 
PROTECTION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 107–08 (2014) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING 
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION].   
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 3 
 
 16 
The FTC may take administrative actions against entities that do not 
maintain reasonable security measures, which typically result in consent 
decrees requiring businesses to put in place a comprehensive security 
program and undertake periodic audits or reviews by a certified third party 
for up to 20 years.
63
 
 
[26] Law firms, like other enterprises, are also subject to federal laws 
that require implementation of security measures.  For example, law firms 
may be considered “business associates” under the Health Information 
Privacy Protection Act (HIPAA)
64
 because they perform functions for 
health care clients, such as reviewing documents that contain health care 
information.
65
  As HIPAA business associates, law firms must follow the 
                                                                                                                                                       
62
 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 13-1887 (ES), 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 84913, at *1 (D.N.J. June 23, 2014).  
 
63
 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Provider of Medical Transcript Services 
Settles FTC Charges That It Failed to Adequately Protect Consumers' Personal 
Information (Jan. 31, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/01/provider-medical-transcript-services-settles-ftc-charges-it, archived at 
http://perma.cc/K6ST-U33C.  The settlement with the company in question (GMR 
Transcription) was the 50th data security case settled by the FTC.  Id.   
 
64
 See Matthew H. Meade, Lawyers and Data Security: Understanding a Lawyer's 
Ethical and Legal Obligations That Arise from Handling Personal Information Provided 
by Clients, 28 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER 1, 7 (Oct. 2011), available at 
http://www.bipc.com/files/Publication/ae615839-5e8f-4ce6-99af-
a6aed9bc6a69/Preview/PublicationAttachment/2ea3d9ea-61bc-4324-8cee-
5df5f01e07dd/CIL_1011_Meade.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2WT5-36J8. 
 
65
 According to the United States Department of Health and Human Services, a “business 
associate” is “a person or entity that performs certain functions or activities that involve 
the use or disclosure of protected health information on behalf of, or provides services to, 
a covered entity.”  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., BUSINESS ASSOCIATES 1 
(2009), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/businessassociates.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/8HWY-QNGR.  The rules relating to business associates 
are set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e) (2014), 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2014), 45 C.F.R. 
§164.532(d) (2014) and 45 C.F.R. §164.532(e) (2014).  A “covered entity” is a provider 
of health care services and “protected health information” (sometimes referred to as PHI) 
is all “individually identifiable health information” held or sent by a “covered entity or its 
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HIPAA Security Rule
66
 requiring them to put in place safeguards to secure 
electronic protected health information.  Although the HIPAA Security 
Rule does not require specific security measures, it recommends 
implementing procedures to insure the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of electronic protected health information to protect against 
reasonably anticipated threats and impermissible uses or disclosures, and 
to ensure compliance by an entity’s employees. 67   If a law firm is a 
HIPAA business associate, it must also report breaches of protected health 
information to the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services and may be subject to fines for such breaches.
68
 
 
B.  Lawyers’ Ethical Obligations to Maintain Client 
Confidences  
 
[27] In addition to being subject to state and federal laws affecting other 
enterprises, lawyers also have independent ethical duties requiring them to 
be aware of the risks of technology and to implement measures to protect 
against unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.   
 
[28] The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“ABA Model 
Rules”), which are followed by most states, establish a competence 
requirement in Rule 1.1 that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent 
                                                                                                                                                       
business associate, in any form or media, whether electronic, on paper, or oral.”  See 
Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health Information in 
Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/De-
identification/guidance.html, archived at http://perma.cc/483U-CWKY (last visited Jan. 
20, 2014). 
 
66
 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1) (2013). 
 
67
 See UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION, supra note 61, at 37–38. 
 
68
 See California Modifies Its Data Breach Notification Requirements Again, supra note 
56, at 37–39. 
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representation to a client.” 69   The ABA Model Rules further state 
“[c]ompetent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”70  Since 2012, comment 8 to Rule 1.1 has provided that 
“[t]o maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep 
abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and 
risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and 
education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to 
which the lawyer is subject.”71 
 
[29] Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules establishes the duty for lawyers 
to maintain the confidentiality of information and requires that “[a] lawyer 
shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless 
the client gives informed consent . . . .”72  Rule 1.6 further provides that 
“[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating 
to the representation of a client.”73   
 
[30] Since 2012, comment 18 to ABA Model Rule 1.6(c) has 
“require[d] a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information relating 
to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third 
parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or 
other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or 
who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision.”74 
                                                             
69
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2014). 
  
70
 Id.  States have adopted these changes, including Pennsylvania.  See Shannon Brown, 
Pennsylvania's New, Technology-related Ethics Rule Changes for Lawyers, SHANNON 
BROWN LAW (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.shannonbrownlaw.com/archives/2109, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Z5V8-2CEK. 
 
71
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 
72
 Id. at R. 1.6(a).  
 
73
 Id. at R. 1.6(c).  
 
74
 Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 18. 
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[31] If the lawyer has “made reasonable efforts to prevent the access of 
disclosure” the Rule is not violated.75  Comment 18 further states that 
 
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness 
of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the 
sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if 
additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of 
employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of 
implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the 
safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent 
clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of 
software excessively difficult to use).  A client may require 
the lawyer to implement special security measures not 
required by this Rule or may give informed consent to 
forgo security measures that would otherwise be required 
by this Rule.  Whether a lawyer may be required to take 
additional steps to safeguard a client’s information in order 
to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws 
that govern data privacy or that impose notification 
requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, 
electronic information, is beyond the scope of these 
Rules.
76
  
 
[32] In Formal Opinion 2010-179, the California Standing Committee 
on Professional Responsibility and Conduct addressed an issue similar to 
that addressed in the 2012 comments to the ABA Model Rules.  Opinion 
2010-179 discussed the issue of whether an attorney violates the duties of 
confidentiality and competence owed to a client “by using technology to 
transmit or store confidential client information when the technology may 
be susceptible to unauthorized access by third parties.”77  The specific 
                                                             
75
 Id.   
 
76
 Id.   
 
77
 State Bar of California Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal 
Op. 2010-179 at 1 (discussing whether an attorney violates duties of confidentiality and 
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context for the opinion was whether an attorney using a laptop to conduct 
legal research and e-mail a client through a public wireless Internet 
connection and through the attorney’s personal wireless system violated 
any ethical rules.
78
   
 
[33] Opinion 2010-179 concluded that the use of a public wireless 
connection without using precautions, such as encryption or a personal 
firewall, risked violating the attorney’s duties of confidentiality and 
competence because of the “lack of security features provided in most 
public wireless access locations.”79  In contrast, the opinion found that the 
use of the attorney’s personal wireless system would not violate the 
attorney’s duties if the system were “configured with appropriate security 
features.”80 
 
[34] Opinion 2010-179 adopted a flexible analytic approach to 
technology, recognizing that technology is “ever-evolving” and is now 
integrated in “virtually every aspect of our daily lives.”81  The opinion 
further recognized that “guidance to attorneys in this area has not kept 
pace with technology” and “[m]any attorneys, as with a large contingent 
of the general public, do not possess much, if any, technological savvy.”82  
Although the opinion found it was unnecessary for attorneys to develop a 
mastery of the security features and deficiencies of each technology 
available, the duties of confidentiality and competence that attorneys owe 
                                                                                                                                                       
competence when using technology to transmit or store confidential client information 
that may be susceptible to unauthorized access by third parties), available at 
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wmqECiHp7h4%3d&tabid=836, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Z2NX-ZWF5.   
 
78
 See id. 
 
79
 Id. at 7. 
 
80
 See id. (noting that features such as firewalls, antivirus and anti-spam software, secure 
username and password combinations, and file permissions as “appropriate.”). 
 
81
 Id. at 1. 
 
82
 Id. at 1, 5. 
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to their clients do require a basic understanding of the electronic 
protections afforded by the technology they use in their practice.  If the 
attorney lacks the necessary competence to assess the security of the 
technology, he or she must seek additional information or consult with 
someone who possesses the necessary knowledge, such as an information 
technology consultant.
83
   
 
[35] Opinion 2010-179 further emphasized that attorneys must ensure 
that law firm personnel are “appropriately instructed regarding client 
confidentiality and are supervised in accordance with rule 3-110.” 84  
Because of “the evolving nature of technology and differences in security 
features that are available, the attorney must ensure the steps are sufficient 
for each form of technology being used and must continue to monitor the 
efficacy of such steps.”85 
 
[36] California Formal Opinion 2010-179, combined with the 2012 
revisions to the ABA Model Rules, place an affirmative obligation on 
lawyers not merely to be generally aware of the risks of technology, but to 
understand how risks relating to a specific technology are evolving.  A 
technology that may have been safe when it was introduced may no longer 
be secure if risks have developed that undermine confidentiality 
protections.    
 
[37] In addition, both the ABA Model Rules and California Formal 
Opinion 2010-179 place an obligation on lawyers to implement a security 
                                                             
83
 State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 
2010-179 at 5, (emphasis added) (citing Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, R. 3-110(C) (2013) 
(“If a member does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal service is 
undertaken, the member may nonetheless perform such services competently by (1) 
associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another lawyer 
reasonably believed to be competent, or (2) by acquiring sufficient learning and skill 
before performance is required.”)), available at 
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wmqECiHp7h4%3d&tabid=836, 
archived at http://perma.cc/F337-JV48. 
 
84
 Id. at 6. 
 
85
 Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
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program protecting confidential data.  Although the precise elements will 
differ for each lawyer or firm, a security program should include 
governance standards, “development of security strategies, plans, policies 
and procedures; creation of inventories of digital assets; selection of 
security controls; determination of technical configuration settings; 
performance of annual audits; and delivery of training.”86  Lawyers and 
law firms should also put in place a cyber response plan allowing them to 
detect problems, determine the cause of the problem, and resolve the 
problem.
87
  As the ABA Cybersecurity Task Force has recommended, 
response plans “should be able to accommodate the full array of threats, 
not just data breaches.”88  Finally, as both the ABA Model Rules and the 
California Opinion 2010-179 recognize, law firms must put training 
programs in place to ensure that law firm personnel are aware of security 
risks and know how to help prevent cyberattacks. 
 
V.  LAWYERS’ USE OF E-MAIL 
 
[38] E-mail has become the most frequently used means of 
communicating within law offices and to clients, obtaining electronic 
alerts regarding deadlines and court filings, coordination of meetings, and 
accessing seemingly endless announcements of CLE seminars and 
communications from vendors.  Because of its ubiquity, many lawyers 
likely believe that e-mail poses few ethical or security risks, other than the 
inadvertent use of “reply all.”   
 
[39] State bar associations addressing the ethics of e-mail have 
generally given it a green light, including lawyer use of Internet-based e-
mail services, such as Gmail or Yahoo! Mail.  Notwithstanding these 
opinions, e-mail poses significant ethical challenges for lawyers, 
particularly in preserving the confidentiality of communications because 
of security risks associated with its transmission and storage.  Some web-
                                                             
86
 MILLER AND RISHIKOF, supra note 42, at 6. 
 
87
 See id. at 6. 
 
88
 See id. at 9. 
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based e-mail providers—including Gmail—present additional challenges, 
because these services use e-mail content to target advertising to users and 
have taken the position that users have no privacy in e-mails.  Finally, 
unencrypted e-mail entails substantial security risks, including 
dissemination of private communications to third parties.  
 
A.  Lawyers’ Ethical Obligations and E-mail 
 
[40] The use of unencrypted e-mail by lawyers received the blessing in 
1999 of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility (“ABA Standing Committee”).89  In Formal 
Opinion 99-413, the ABA Standing Committee concluded that “[a] lawyer 
may transmit information relating to the representation of a client by 
unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (1998) because the mode of transmission 
affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a technological and legal 
standpoint.”90  In reaching the conclusion, Opinion 99-413 found “[t]he 
same privacy accorded U.S. and commercial mail, land-line telephonic 
transmissions, and facsimiles applies to Internet e-mail.”91 
 
[41] From today’s perspective, the conclusion in Opinion 99-413 that e-
mail has the “same privacy” as mail is not merely “obsolete,” but 
misguided.
92
  The fact that e-mails can be saved electronically and readily 
forwarded (deliberately or inadvertently) to third parties, makes them 
considerably less secure than mail, facsimiles, and telephone calls.  To 
take but one current example, the embarrassing e-mails disseminated 
through the SPE hack that have threatened the careers of several 
                                                             
89
 The ABA’s opinion was preceded by those of other organizations, including state bar 
associations.  See Rebecca Bolin, Symposium, Risky Mail: Concerns in Confidential 
Attorney-Client Email, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 601, 616–18 (2012). 
 
90
 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (discussing 
protection of confidentiality of unencrypted e-mail).   
 
91
 Id.  
 
92
 See Bolin, supra note 89, at 603, 618. 
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prominent executives—including the co-chairman of the company—
would not have come to light if the executives in question had confined 
their views to a telephone conversation or a note sent by mail.
93
   
 
[42] In reaching its 1999 conclusion regarding e-mail privacy, the ABA 
Standing Committee relied on a 1998 article by David Hricik with the 
comforting title E-mail and Client Confidentiality: Lawyers Worry Too 
Much about Transmitting Client Confidences by Internet E-mail.
94
  As has 
been noted by other commentators, Professor Hricik’s reassuring 
conclusions regarding e-mail privacy and confidentiality depended on the 
then state of e-mail technology.  In the mid and late 1990’s, e-mails 
typically traveled to personal computers with limited storage space.  
Service providers like AOL “deleted mail off [their] servers after a few 
days to save on then-expensive storage.” 95   In contrast, storage space 
today is extremely inexpensive and recipients often preserve vast numbers 
of sent and received e-mails for many years.  E-mails are routinely backed 
up on an enterprise’s servers and can be accessed—like those of SPE—by 
malicious parties or disseminated by careless insiders.  Moreover, e-mails 
sent from web-based services such as Gmail, Yahoo!, or Outlook may be 
stored indefinitely in large numbers in the cloud and may thus exist 
“without a user’s knowledge as an archival or back-up copy.”96   
 
[43] In 2011, the ABA Standing Committee issued an opinion that 
                                                             
93
 See Daniel Miller, Future of Sony's Amy Pascal Questioned After Hacked Email 
Revelations, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2014, 6:20 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-sony-amy-pascal-
apologizes-20141212-story.html#page=1, archived at http://perma.cc/2JAM-JLCY.   
 
94
 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) 
(discussing confidentiality of unencrypted e-mail) (citing David Hricik, E-mail and 
Client Confidentiality: Lawyers Worry Too Much about Transmitting Client Confidences 
by Internet E-mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 479 (1998)).   
 
95
 Bolin, supra note 89, at 609. 
 
96
 See id., at 611–12. 
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qualified its 1999 opinion regarding the propriety of e-mail use.
97
  In 
Formal Opinion 11-459, the ABA Standing Committee concluded that 
lawyers: 
 
[S]ending or receiving substantive communications with a 
client via e-mail or other electronic means ordinarily must 
warn the client about the risk of sending or receiving 
electronic communications using a computer or other 
device, or e-mail account, where there is a significant risk 
that a third party may gain access.
98
 
 
Opinion 11-459 specifically cautioned lawyers about having their clients 
communicate with them using an employer’s computer or device because 
employers “often have policies reserving a right of access to employees’ 
e-mail correspondence via the employer’s e-mail account, computers or 
other devices, such as smartphones and tablet devices, from which their 
employees correspond.”99   Opinion 11-459 also recognized that e-mail 
subject to access by third parties may compromise a lawyer’s ethical 
duties to preserve client confidences.
100
 
 
B.  Lawyers’ Use of Web-Based E-mail  
  
[44] Although many lawyers rely on enterprise e-mail systems run by 
their law firms, other lawyers—particularly those in small to medium size 
firms—may use web-based e-mail systems such as Gmail, Outlook, 
Yahoo! Mail, or AOL.  Particularly popular is Google’s Gmail, which is 
                                                             
97
 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011) 
(discussing the duty to protect confidentiality of e-mail communications with clients), 
available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
11_459_nm_formal_opinion.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/UG3HFVCX; see also Bolin, supra note 89, at 622. 
 
98
 Id.  
 
99
 Id.  
 
100
 Id. 
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free and offers 1 GB of storage.
101
  An analyst estimated 60% of mid-size 
companies had their e-mail hosted by Google in 2014 and that 92% of 
startups or very small companies use Google.
102
  From the point of view of 
their ethical obligations, lawyers may have concerns that Google scans e-
mails to provide targeted advertising to its users.  For example, a lawyer 
using Gmail to communicate with a client regarding a meeting at a 
particular hotel may find that she is being targeted with advertisements for 
that hotel.  Although this sort of advertising may be innocuous, there may 
be greater concerns if advertisements are based on more sensitive content, 
such as a client’s medical condition or employment relationship with a 
particular company. 
 
1.  The Ethics of Gmail 
 
[45] In 2008, the New York State Bar Association Committee on 
Professional Ethics in Ethics Opinion 820 addressed the question of 
whether lawyers may use programs that scan e-mails.
103
  Although the 
opinion did not mention Gmail by name, it clearly referenced the service 
by posing the question of whether “a lawyer [may] use an e-mail service 
provider that scans e-mails by computer for keywords and then sends or 
displays instantaneously (to the side of the e-mails in question) computer-
generated advertisements to users of the service based on the e-mail 
communications.”104   
                                                             
101
 See Lots of free storage, GOOGLE, 
https://www.gmail.com/intl/en_us/mail/help/features.html#storage, archived at 
https://perma.cc/6NDC-NKBC (last modified Apr. 14, 2014) (indicating that users get 
15GB of free storage across Gmail, Google Drive, and Google+ Photos). 
 
102
 See Dan Frommer, Google is Stealing away Microsoft's Future Corporate Customers, 
QUARTZ (Aug. 1, 2014), http://qz.com/243321/google-is-stealing-away-microsofts-
future-corporate-customers/, archived at http://perma.cc/WB79-W9LT.   
 
103
 See New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 820 (2008) (discussing 
use of e-mail services that scan e-mail for advertising purposes), available at 
http://old.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&template=/CM/Conte
ntDisplay.cfm&ContentID=55868, archived at http://perma.cc/XB8V-JCGJ.   
 
104
 Id. 
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[46] Ethics Opinion 820 found the “risks posed to client confidentiality 
[by the e-mail service] are not meaningfully different from the risks in 
using other e-mail service providers that do not employ this practice” 
because “no individuals other than e-mail senders and recipients read the 
e-mail messages.”105  The opinion further stated that the committee would 
have reached “the opposite conclusion if the e-mails were reviewed by 
human beings or if the service provider reserved the right to disclose the e-
mails or the substance of the communications to third parties without the 
sender’s permission (or a lawful judicial order).”106 
 
2.  Gmail and Google’s Terms of Service 
 
[47] The conclusion that Google’s Gmail passes ethical muster because 
no human being reviews e-mails does not address all the potential risks 
posed by web-based e-mail services.  For example, Ethics Opinion 820 did 
not discuss the implications that Google’s Terms of Service (“TOS”), 
privacy policies, and other Google statements regarding e-mail privacy 
have on expectations of privacy in Gmail.  
 
[48] E-mail providers’ policies and terms of service have been called 
“the persistent elephant in the room” regarding e-mail privacy.107  The 
current version of Google’s TOS—which applies not only to Gmail, but to 
                                                             
105
 Id. 
 
106
 Id.; see also Kevin Raudebaugh, Trusting the Machines: New York State Bar Ethics 
Opinion Allows Attorneys to Use Gmail, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 83, 90–91 (2010).  
The Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility also found that the use of Gmail is acceptable.  Pennsylvania Bar Ass’n 
Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2011-200 (2011), available 
at http://forctlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/PA-opinion-2011-200.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/U6GM-EEG6 (discussing ethical obligations for attorneys 
using cloud computing software as a service).   
 
107
 Bolin, supra note 89, at 640–41 (“The assumed privacy protections [for e-mail] are 
now hazy or even hostile to privacy interests, and the assumed practices to keep e[-]mail 
confidential will obviously depend on the privacy policy.  Today’s user should be very 
concerned about the case-specific policies relating to e[-]mail.”). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 3 
 
 28 
all of Google’s “Services,” including popular cloud-based products such 
as Google Apps—contains several provisions that may impact lawyers’ 
expectations of privacy and confidentiality in their communications to 
clients.
108
   
 
[49] For example, although Google’s TOS states that users “retain 
ownership of any intellectual property rights that [they] hold in . . . 
content” that is uploaded, submitted, stored, send or received through its 
services, it also states that users 
 
[G]ive Google (and those we work with) a worldwide 
license to use, host, store, reproduce, modify, create 
derivative works (such as those resulting from translations, 
adaptations or other changes we make so that your content 
works better with our Services), communicate, publish, 
publicly perform, publicly display and distribute such 
content.
109
   
This “license”110 is “for the limited purpose of operating, promoting, and 
improving our Services, and to develop new ones.”111   
 
[50] Regarding targeted advertising, Google's TOS states that  “[o]ur 
automated systems analyze your content (including e[-]mails) to provide 
you personally relevant product features, such as customized search 
results, tailored advertising, and spam and malware detection.  This 
analysis occurs as the content is sent, received, and when it is stored.”112 
                                                             
108
 See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7R26-WU66 (last modified April 14, 2014) [hereinafter 
Google Terms of Service].   
 
109
 Id. 
 
110
 See Roland L. Trope & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning—Professional 
Ethics at the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 111, 248–49 (2011) 
(expressing doubt that a “license” is indeed created through the Google TOS). 
 
111
 Google Terms of Service, supra note 108. 
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[51] Google also reserves the right to “suspend or stop a Service 
altogether,” although “where reasonably possible, we will give you 
reasonable advance notice and a chance to get information out of that 
Service.”113  Google further disclaims all warranties and reserves the right 
to “modify these terms or any additional terms that apply to a Service . . . 
.”114  Google also warns that it may modify the terms in the future and 
requests users to “look at [its] terms regularly.”115  If a user does not 
“agree to the modified terms for a Service, [the user] should discontinue . . 
. use of the Service.”116 
 
[52] A lawyer using Gmail may have concerns regarding several 
aspects of Google’s TOS, including the company’s unilateral right to 
“communicate, publish, publicly perform, publicly display and distribute” 
the content of potentially privileged or confidential e-mails.
117
  Although 
publication is ostensibly for the “limited purpose” of “operating, 
promoting, and improving our Services, and to develop new ones,” the 
provision is broad enough to encompass several troubling scenarios, 
including Google’s analyzing attorney-client privilege documents to 
establish a new product aimed at lawyers.
118
  Lawyers may also be given 
pause by the fact that Google can unilaterally suspend services, disclaim 
all warranties, and place the onus of determining whether the TOS has 
changed on the users of the service whose only option if they agree with 
                                                                                                                                                       
112
 Id.  
 
113
 Id.  
 
114
 Id.  
 
115
 Id.  
 
116
 Id.  
 
117
 Google Terms of Service, supra note 108. 
 
118
 Id.  
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the new TOS is to quit using Gmail.
119
   
 
3.  Gmail Users’ Expectations of Privacy 
 
[53] Nothing in Google’s TOS states that users have any expectation of 
privacy for the electronic communications they send or receive through 
Gmail.  Indeed, Google has taken the position that individuals sending e-
mails to Gmail accounts have no expectation of privacy.  When Google 
was sued in federal court in 2010 for violating state and federal anti-
wiretapping laws for intercepting, reading and acquiring the content of e-
mails sent or received by Gmail users while the e-mails were in transit, 
Google argued in a motion to dismiss the complaint that those sending e-
mails to Gmail users had consented to Google processing their messages, 
including accessing the content of messages.
120
  Google stated in the 
motion that  
 
Just as a sender of a letter to a business colleague cannot be 
surprised that the recipient’s assistant opens the letter, 
people who use web-based e-mail today cannot be 
surprised if their communications are processed by the 
recipient’s E[lectronic] C[ommunication] S[ervice] 
provider in the course of delivery.  Indeed, “a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”121   
                                                             
119
 See Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 248–49 (prior Google TOS created an 
“[i]ncreased [r]isk of [i]nadvertent [g]rant of [l]icense to [c]lient’s [i]ntellectual 
[p]roperty” and raised a “serious ethical risk[] for a law firm or lawyers that use, or allow 
their staff to use, Google Docs when generating or revising documents that contain client 
confidential data and content in which the client has intellectual property rights”). 
 
120
 See Steven Musil, Google Filing Says Gmail Users Have No Expectation of Privacy, 
CNET (Aug. 13, 2013, 7:57 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/google-filing-says-gmail-
users-have-no-expectation-of-privacy/, archived at http://perma.cc/EKG4-X9XL. 
 
121
 Defendant Google Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Individual and 
Class Action Complaint at 19, In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 5:13-md-02430-LHK 
(N.D. Cal. June 6, 2013) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)), 
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Google further argued that “the automated processing of e[-]mail is so 
widely understood and accepted that the act of sending an e[-]mail 
constitutes implied consent to automated processing as a matter of law.”122 
 
[54] In rejecting Google’s argument, the court found that there was no 
support for Google’s “far-reaching proposition” that users do not have an 
expectation in privacy when using a web-based e-mail service.
123
  The 
court instead held that senders only “consent[] to the intended recipient’s 
recording of the e-mail—not, as has been alleged here, interception by a 
third-party service provider.”124   
 
Google has cited no case that stands for the proposition that 
users who send e[-]mails impliedly consent to interceptions 
and use of their communications by third parties other than 
the intended recipient of the e[-]mail. . . .  Accepting 
Google’s theory of implied consent—that by merely 
sending e[-]mails to or receiving e[-]mails from a Gmail 
user, a non-Gmail user has consented to Google’s 
interception of such e[-]mails for any purposes—would 
eviscerate the rule against interception.
125
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/googlemotion061313.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/J46Z-SZRM. 
 
122
 Id. 
 
123
 See In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
172784, at *55–57 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013). 
 
124
 Id. at 55–56 (emphasis added). 
 
125
 Id. at 56.  Although Judge Koh rejected many of Google’s arguments in its motion to 
dismiss, she later denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, finding that many of the 
issues regarding implied consent were factual in nature and thus created substantial 
differences among class members.  See In re Google, Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-
02430-LHK, 2014 WL 1102660, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014). 
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[55] Google’s argument that those who send e-mails to Gmail users 
have no expectation of privacy may raise red flags for lawyers using 
Gmail to make or receive confidential client communications.  The fact 
that Google has not only taken that position but also makes no 
commitment to preserve the privacy of communications sent through 
Gmail raises doubts as to whether lawyers using Gmail can reasonably 
comply with their duty of confidentiality.
126
  Although Google—like most 
companies—has a privacy policy, that policy only restricts the manner in 
which Google shares personal information with “companies, organizations 
and individuals outside of Google.” 127  Google’s privacy policy does not 
restrict Google’s own use of personal information and is inapplicable to 
sensitive or confidential information, such as attorney-client 
communications, that contains no “personal” information.128 
 
[56] In arguing that those who send e-mails through Gmail have no 
expectation of privacy, Google cited the controversial “third party 
doctrine” set forth in the 1979 case of Smith v. Maryland.129  Under the 
third party doctrine, an individual voluntarily turning over information to a 
third party assumes the risk that the third party will turn the information 
                                                             
126
 The protection of users’ e-mails by the Electronic Communication Privacy Act 
(ECPA) and the Stored Communications Act (SCA) of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. is 
beyond the scope of this article, but is widely discussed elsewhere.  See, e.g., Jacob M. 
Small, Storing Documents in the Cloud: Toward an Evidentiary Privilege Protecting 
Papers and Effects Stored on the Internet, 23 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 255, 266 (2013). 
 
127
 Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZGP6-B357 (last modified Dec. 19, 2014) (emphasis added).  Google 
states that it shares personal information with “companies, organizations and individuals 
outside of Google” only with users’ consent, with domain administrators, for external 
processing, and for legal reasons.  Id. 
 
128
 See id.  “Personal information” is defined in Google’s Privacy Policy as “information 
which you provide to us which personally identifies you, such as your name, e[-]mail 
address or billing information, or other data which can be reasonably linked to such 
information by Google.”  Key Terms, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/key-terms/, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7VR-
37X5 (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).   
 
129
 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).  
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over to another party and thus has no expectation of privacy in the 
information.
130
  As argued by Google (but rejected by the district court), 
Gmail users may not have an expectation of privacy or confidentiality in 
e-mail messages because Google reserves the right to access or “process” 
the e-mails.  
 
[57] Although the Supreme Court has yet to address applicability of the 
third party doctrine to the digital world, it may have an opportunity to do 
so in the context of challenges to the National Security Agency’s mass 
collection of telephony metadata that was the centerpiece of Edward 
Snowden’s 2013 revelations regarding NSA practices.131  The two federal 
courts that have addressed the constitutionality of the NSA’s program to 
date have reached opposite results.
132
   
 
4.  E-mail Security Risks. 
 
[58] Although some lawyers may not be concerned about Google’s 
reliance on the third party doctrine (which was rejected by the court in the 
Gmail litigation), they may nonetheless have concerns regarding the more 
general security risks posed by unauthorized distribution of confidential e-
mails by insiders and outsiders.  Because e-mail can be readily forwarded 
either deliberately or accidentally to third parties, it is far less secure than 
                                                             
130
 See id. at 743–44. 
 
131
 See THE WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER BULK COLLECTION OF 
TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT (2013), 
available at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Section215.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7YMA-7ZAN.  
 
132
 In Klayman v. Obama, the court found that the program was unconstitutional because 
technological advances have made the third party doctrine inapplicable.  Klayman v. 
Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C. 2013).  A week later, the court in American Civil 
Liberties Union v. Clapper reached the opposite conclusion.  American Civil Liberties 
Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Jack Lerner et al., 
The Duty of Confidentiality in the Surveillance Age, 17 J. INTERNET L., Apr. 2014, at 17 
(arguing that lawyers’ duty of confidentiality may be compromised by NSA programs 
and that “NSA surveillance revelations require attorneys to re-evaluate the security of 
communications over the Internet and ‘in the cloud.’”).  
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using postal servicesas the SPE executives discovered when their 
embarrassing e-mails were revealed by hackers.
133
  Although mail may be 
misaddressed or misdelivered, there is no “reply all” button for postal 
mail, nor is it generally subject to being stolen by malicious outsiders.  
 
[59] As earlier discussed, hackers often use social engineering 
techniques, including “spear-fishing,” which is typically delivered through 
e-mails, to try to obtain valuable or confidential information.  Through 
these techniques, hackers may gain access not only to e-mails, but to 
documents containing personal, proprietary or confidential information in 
the entire computer system.
134
   
 
[60] The security of e-mail also rests to a large extent on the security of 
passwords, which offer little protection against hackers.  Like other forms 
of personal information, hackers are interested in passwords because they 
provide a means to access banking and retail accounts.  Because many 
individuals use the same password for several accounts, hackers seek 
users’ passwords either through “phishing” or hacks of large numbers of 
stored passwords.  For example, a hack in 2013 of the online dating 
service Cupid Media “exposed more than 42 million consumer records, 
including names, e[-]mail addresses, unencrypted passwords and birthdays 
. . . .”135  In 2012, a Russian hacker site posted 6.5 million passwords 
hacked from LinkedIn.
136
  The “Heartbleed” bug in 2014 infected the 
technology that encrypts communications with websites and exposed 
millions of passwords.
137
 
                                                             
133
 See Miller, supra note 93.  
 
134
 See Danhieux, supra note 30; Cooney, supra note 20.  
 
135
 Brian Krebs, Cupid Media Hack Exposed 42M Passwords, KREBS ON SECURITY (Nov. 
20, 2013), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/11/cupid-media-hack-exposed-42m-
passwords/, archived at http://perma.cc/S69D-UHPN.   
 
136
 See Sara Gates, LinkedIn Password Hack: Check to See if Yours Was One of the 6.5 
Million Leaked, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2012, 11:25 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/linkedin-password-hack-
check_n_1577184.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HS5F-VEX3.   
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[61] The evolving security threats to e-mail undermine the assumptions 
of prior opinions finding that e-mail is an ethical means of communicating 
client confidential information.  As with all technology, lawyers must base 
their considerations of what is reasonable to preserve client confidences 
not on past parameters, but on the current state of technology and security 
risks.
138
  Because of current security concerns, lawyers should consider 
whether the use of unencrypted e-mail for sensitive and confidential 
communications fulfills their ethical duties. 
 
VI.  LAWYERS’ USE OF CLOUD COMPUTING SERVICES 
 
[62] “Cloud computing” is a vague and frequently misunderstood 
marketing term.  For example, in a recent Dilbert cartoon the perennial 
malingerer Wally told the “Pointy Haired Boss,” “[i]f you need me, I’ll be 
in the cloud fixing a software issue.”  He also told his boss that because 
“[t]here’s no cell coverage in the cloud, so it might seem to you as if I am 
at home doing nothing.”139   
 
[63] In point of fact, the “cloud” is not located in the sky (or in Wally’s 
home) but is instead a name for the outsourcing of computing functions 
through servers owned by “cloud computing providers” and not by 
companies themselves.
140
  Customers, including law firms, realize benefits 
from such outsourcing, including cost savings that “allow businesses to 
avoid the burden of the security and management responsibilities 
associated with data storage, as well as the complexities of maintaining the 
                                                                                                                                                       
137
 See Brian Krebs, “Heartbleed” Bug Exposes Passwords, Web Site Encryption Keys, 
KREBS ON SECURITY (Apr. 8, 2014), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/04/heartbleed-bug-
exposes-passwords-web-site-encryption-keys/, archived at http://perma.cc/4CM7-RP8M.   
 
138
 See Bolin, supra note 89, at 622. 
 
139
 Scott Adams, Comics, DILBERT (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.dilbert.com/2014-12-08/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/G8L6-P5MQ.  
 
140
 See Kenneth L. Bostick, Pie in the Sky: Cloud Computing Brings an End to the 
Professional Paradigm in the Practice of Law, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1375, 1381–82, 1384–
85 (2012). 
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infrastructure under which the data is held.”141 
 
[64] According to the working definition of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), “[c]loud computing is a model for 
enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released 
with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” 142  
There are several varieties of cloud computing services, including: cloud 
software as a service (SaaS), which allows users to run software through a 
cloud infrastructure; cloud platform as a service (PaaS), which allows 
users to run their own applications using the programming language 
provided by the service; and cloud infrastructure as a service (IaaS), which 
allows “the consumer . . . to provision processing, storage, networks, and 
other fundamental computing resources where the consumer is able to 
deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems 
and applications.”143 
 
[65] The most frequent law firm uses of the cloud are running software 
applications (such as word processing, spreadsheets, and accounting) and 
storing documents.  For example, lawyers, like other consumers, may use 
Amazon’s Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) to store documents,144 or 
Google’s Docs, Sheets and Slides (available through Google’s web 
browser Chrome) to create documents, spreadsheets and presentation 
slides.
145
  Such services are generally referred to as “public clouds,” in 
                                                             
141
 Id. at 1376; see also Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 164–65 (describing the 
history of use of cloud services); Woods, supra note 5 (describing the exponential growth 
of cloud computing services in recent years). 
 
142
 PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 
(2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ENM9-B4MQ. 
  
143
 Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 168. 
 
144
 See Amazon S3, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/s3/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/2L3D-5TED (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).   
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other words, services offered to the general public.
146
  In addition, law 
firms may also use free document sharing servicessuch as Dropbox or 
Boxfor a wide variety of purposes.147 
 
[66] Law firms also make use of “private clouds,” which are off-site 
servers not generally available to the public which the firm pays a third 
party to manage.
148
  Law firms use private clouds for wide variety of 
services, including accounting, software, and storage of documents.
149
  
Although the following discussion concentrates on the use of the public 
cloud, it applies in certain respectsincluding security and control 
issuesto private clouds.   
 
A.  Ethics of Lawyers’ Use of Public Cloud Computing 
Services 
 
[67] Bar organizations have generally concluded that lawyers may 
entrust confidential documents to cloud computing providers if certain 
conditions are met.  The nineteen different state bodies
150
 that have 
                                                                                                                                                       
145
 See Edit Office Files in Google Docs, Sheets, and Slides, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/docs/answer/6049100?hl=en, archived at 
https://perma.cc/35UT-4WTP (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
 
146
 See Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 170.  
 
147
 See Law Firm File Sharing in 2014, LEXISNEXIS 6 (May 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/BusinessofLaw/lexisnexis-2014-survey-of-lfile-sharing-
survey-report-final, archived at http://perma.cc/Z8KM-WAK6.  The report also found 
that lawyers were often unaware of whether other lawyers in their firm used file-sharing 
services.  Id. at 7. 
 
148
 See Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 170.  
 
149
 See Stephanie L. Kimbro & Tom Mighell, Popular Cloud Computing Services for 
Lawyers: Practice Management Online, L. PRAC. MAG., Sept./Oct. 2011, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_magazine/2011/september_octob
er/popular_cloud_computing_services_for_lawyers.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/WEW7-2HWS (listing numerous cloud applications available to 
lawyers). 
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reviewed the issue to date have found cloud computing ethical if lawyers 
“take reasonable steps to ensure that their law firm’s confidential data is 
protected from unauthorized third party access.”151 
 
[68] For example, Iowa Ethics Opinion 11-01, which addressed issues 
of confidentiality in the cloud, concluded that  
 
A lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the 
information from coming into the hands of unintended 
recipients.  This duty, however, does not require that the 
lawyer use special security measures if the method of 
communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Special circumstances, however, may warrant special 
precautions.  Factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of the lawyer’s expectation of 
confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information 
and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is 
protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement.
152
 
                                                                                                                                                       
150
 See Cloud Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/res
ources/charts_fyis/cloud-ethics-chart.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TJU8-JQF2 (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2015).  
 
151
 Nicole Black, The Ethics of Cloud Computing for Lawyers, ABA (2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2012/september_2012/ethics_cl
oud_computing_lawyers.html, archived at http://perma.cc/B285-7NAD; see also Thomas 
G. Wilkinson Jr., Ethics Digest, 34 PA. LAW. 49, 49 (2012) (discussing Pennsylvania Bar 
Association Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Committee Formal Opinion 
2011–200); Robert Ambrogi, Cloud Ethics Opinions: A Full List (Maybe), LAW SITES 
BLOG (May 23, 2014), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2014/05/cloud-ethics-opinions-full-
list.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5SLB-W8WR. 
  
152
 Letter from Nick Critelli, Comm. Chair, Iowa State Bar Ass’n Ethics & Practice 
Guidelines Comm., to Dwight Dinkla, Exec Dir. Iowa State Bar Ass’n (Sept. 9, 2011) 
(quoting Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.6), available at http://www.wicsec.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011%20WICSEC%20Conference%20Materials/M-
6%20Iowa%20Bar%20Ethics%20Opinion%209911%20-%20Worley,%20Peiper.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/NTS7-5CAH; Black, supra note 151 (analyzing Iowa State 
Bar Association’s opinion). 
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[69] Opinion 842 of the New York State Bar Association Committee on 
Professional Ethics similarly addressed the ethical propriety of cloud 
computing.
153
  Opinion 842 concluded that use of online systems to store 
confidential information implicated Rule 1.6’s confidentiality requirement, 
but found that a lawyer can use a cloud service to store client files 
“provided that the lawyer takes reasonable care to ensure that the system is 
secure and that client confidentiality will be maintained.”154 
 
[70] Opinion 842 found that necessary “[r]easonable care . . . may 
include consideration” of four issues: 
 
(1) Ensuring that the online data storage provider has an 
enforceable obligation to preserve confidentiality and 
security, and that the provider will notify the lawyer if 
served with process requiring the production of client 
information; 
(2) Investigating the online data storage provider’s security 
measures, policies, recoverability methods, and other 
procedures to determine if they are adequate under the 
circumstances; 
(3) Employing available technology to guard against 
reasonably foreseeable attempts to infiltrate the data 
that is stored; and/or 
(4) Investigating the storage provider’s ability to purge and 
wipe any copies of the data, and to move the data to a 
different host, if the lawyer becomes dissatisfied with 
the storage provider or for other reasons changes 
storage providers.
155
 
                                                             
153
 See New York State Bar Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 842 (2010), available at 
http://old.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&ContentID=140010&t
emplate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/P6P8-CJKR (using 
outside online storage provider to store client confidential information).   
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[71] Opinion 842 cautioned that “[t]echnology and security of stored 
data are changing rapidly” and that “the lawyer should periodically 
reconfirm that the provider’s security measures remain effective in light of 
advances in technology.”156  The lawyer also has the duty, if he or she 
learns that security measures are ineffective, to “investigate whether there 
has been any breach of his or her clients’ confidential information, notify 
any affected clients, and discontinue use of the service unless the lawyer 
receives assurances that any security issues have been sufficiently 
remediated.”157  Lawyers must also monitor the law relating to technology, 
which “is changing rapidly,” to see “when using technology may waive an 
otherwise applicable privilege.”158 
 
[72] New York Opinion 842 echoes the approach to technology taken in 
California Ethics Opinion 2010-179.
159
  Although the California opinion 
dealt with the propriety of a lawyer using public and home wireless 
technology, its conclusion that lawyers must be cognizant of the effect of 
changing technology and security threats is equally applicable to cloud 
computing.  As Opinion 2010-179 states, “[t]he greater the sensitivity of 
the information, the less risk the attorney should take with technology.  If 
the information is of a highly sensitive nature and there is a risk of 
disclosure when using a particular technology, the attorney should 
consider alternatives unless the client provides informed consent.” 160  
Moreover, “if a particular technology lacks essential security features, use 
                                                             
156
 Id. 
 
157
 Id. 
 
158
 Id. (citing City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762–63 (2010) (dealing with 
expectations of privacy in mobile technology as an example of changes that may affect 
privilege)). 
 
159
 See Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 192–93. 
 
160
 State Bar of California Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal 
Op. 2010-179 (2010), available at 
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wmqECiHp7h4%3d&tabid=836, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4BKQ-HL3Z.  
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of such a technology could be deemed to have waived [attorney-client] 
protections.  Where the attorney-client privilege is at issue, failure to use 
sufficient precautions may be considering in determining waiver.”161 
 
B.  Security Risks of Lawyers’ Use of Public Cloud Computing 
Services 
 
[73] Although the California, Iowa and New York ethics opinions 
require lawyers to assess—and continue to assess—the security features of 
cloud computing providers, lawyers may have difficulties in fulfilling this 
obligation with major public cloud providers.  As with e-mail, the standard 
policies of many public cloud providers—including Amazon and 
Google—make it challenging for lawyers to determine whether these 
services have the security measures required by ethics opinions. 
 
[74] For example, Google’s TOS states that Google provides its 
services “using a commercially reasonable level of skill and care.”162  
Notwithstanding this commitment, Google’s TOS states (in all capital 
letters) “NEITHER GOOGLE NOR ITS SUPPLIERS OR 
DISTRIBUTORS MAKE ANY SPECIFIC PROMISES ABOUT THE 
SERVICES.  FOR EXAMPLE, WE DON’T MAKE ANY 
COMMITMENTS ABOUT THE CONTENT WITHIN THE SERVICES, 
THE SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS OF THE SERVICES, OR THEIR 
RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY, OR ABILITY TO MEET YOUR 
NEEDS.  WE PROVIDE THE SERVICES ‘AS IS.’”163   Google also 
excludes all warranties and further states (again in all capital letters) 
“WHEN PERMITTED BY LAW, GOOGLE AND GOOGLE’S 
SUPPLIERS AND DISTRIBUTORS, WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR LOST PROFITS, REVENUES, OR DATA, FINANCIAL LOSSES 
OR INDIRECT, SPECIAL CONSEQUENTIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR 
                                                             
161
 Id.; see also Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 192–93 (discussing the applicability 
of ethical opinions to cloud computing).  
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES.”164 
 
[75] Under the heading “Business uses of our Services,” Google’s TOS 
states that a “business accepts these terms” and 
  
[W]ill hold harmless and indemnify Google and its 
affiliates, officers, agents, and employees from any claim, 
suit or action arising from or related to the use of the 
Services or violation of these terms, including any liability 
or expense arising from claims, losses, damages, suits 
judgments, litigation costs and attorneys’ fees.165   
 
[76] Google’s TOS also incorporates the company’s privacy policy,166 
which includes a section on “information security” stating that, generally, 
“[w]e work hard to protect Google and our users from unauthorized access 
to or unauthorized alteration, disclosure or destruction of information we 
hold.” 167   Google’s privacy policy also states that it encrypts certain 
services using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), offers two step verification 
and a safe browsing feature in Google Chrome, and reviews its 
“information collection, storage and processing practices, including 
physical security measures, to guard against unauthorized access to 
systems.”168  Finally, Google restricts “access to personal information to 
Google employees, contractors and agents who need to know that 
information in order to process it for us, and who are subject to strict 
contractual confidentiality obligations and may be disciplined or 
terminated if they fail to meet these obligations.”169 
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165
 Id.  
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 Id.  
 
167
 Privacy Policy, supra note 127. 
 
168
 Id.  
 
169
 Id.  
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[77] Google’s TOS and Privacy Policy do not provide any means for an 
attorney using Google’s services to measure or assess the company’s 
protection of confidential information stored or processed through the 
services.  Not only does Google expressly decline to make any specific 
promises about its services—including the security of information stored 
on Google servers—it also requires business users to indemnify Google 
for any lawsuits “arising from or related to the use of the Services.”170 
 
[78] Google’s Privacy Policy also makes no commitments regarding 
security of customers’ information.  Indeed, whatever restrictions the 
privacy policy places on dissemination of information are restricted to 
“personal information,”171 which is a considerably narrower category than 
information that lawyers may consider to be confidential.  Google’s 
“license” to the content of documents stored on its servers and its right to 
make “derivative works” are also troublesome from the point of view of 
maintaining client confidentiality for information stored on Google’s 
services.
172
 
 
[79] Amazon similarly limits its liability for its “cloud drive,” which 
provides remote storage for documents, by stating that 
 
(a) in no event will our or our software licensors’ total liability 
to you for all damages (other than as may be required by 
applicable law in cases involving personal injury) arising 
                                                             
170
 Google Terms of Service, supra note 108. 
 
171
 See Key Terms, supra note 128 (defining “personal information” as “information 
which you provide to us which personally identifies you, such as your name, e[-]mail 
address or billing information, or other data which can be reasonably linked to such 
information by Google.”). 
 
172
 See Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 248–50 (“There are probably few, if any, 
clients that would be willing to agree to grant a cloud vendor a right to any content that 
the client may generate or that its attorneys may generate through the use of a cloud-
based, word-processing program such as Google Docs.  A lawyer or law firm would 
certainly also be unwilling to agree to grant such a license.”).  
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out of or related to your use or inability to use the Software 
exceed the amount of fifty dollars ($50.00);  
(b) in no event will our total liability to you for all damages 
arising from your use of the Service or information, 
materials or products included on or otherwise made 
available to you through the Service (excluding the 
Software), exceed the amount you paid for the Service 
related to your claim for damages; and 
(c) we have no liability for any loss, damage or 
misappropriation of Your Files under any circumstances or 
for any consequences related to changes, restrictions, 
suspensions or termination of the Service or the 
Agreement. These limitations will apply to you even if the 
remedies fail of their essential purpose.
173
 
 
Cloud service providers like Google and Amazon also make it difficult for 
attorneys to assure that they will be informed by the providers of any 
breach of security in the system.  Under Google and other providers’ TOS, 
there is “no assurance that a customer would be given any explanation of 
faults in the system.” 174   Moreover, most public cloud computing 
providers, like Amazon and Google, make no commitments regarding the 
preservation and retrieval of documents from their services nor do they 
affirmatively state that they will provide information to users about 
security compromises.
175
  “It is, therefore, questionable whether a lawyer 
or law firm who relinquishes control over the storage of its data would be 
acting reasonably when it has little to no control over security 
breaches.”176  Because state data breach notification laws pertain only to 
personal data, there is no legal obligation for public cloud providers to 
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 Amazon Cloud Drive Terms of Use, AMAZON, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201376540, archived at 
http://perma.cc/KJX3-GMVS (last updated Nov. 11, 2014).   
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 Trope & Hughes, supra note 110, at 201–02. 
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 See id. at 206–07 (noting that Amazon's agreement removed any such assurances). 
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Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XXI, Issue 3 
 
 45 
provide notice to users regarding compromise of non-personal data such as 
confidential documents stored on a service.
177
   
 
[80] Cloud computing also entails more general security concerns.  A 
2010 article by Christopher Soghoian argues that security concerns are 
inherent to cloud computing and thus “render[] the cloud computing 
model fundamentally unfit for the practice of law.”178  These “inherent” 
risks include transmittal of user names and passwords to servers via 
unencrypted network connections, transmittal of data that “‘can easily be 
snooped on by hackers’” and encryption that is restricted to initial login 
information.
179
  The Cloud Security Alliance has also assembled a list of 
the top nine security risks to the cloud: “(1) [d]ata [b]reaches; (2) [d]ata 
[l]oss;” (3) account [or service traffic] hijacking; (4) insecure [interfaces 
and] APIs; “(5) [d]enial of [s]ervice; (6) [m]alicious [i]nsiders; (7) [a]buse 
of [c]loud [s]ervices; (8) [i]nsufficient [d]ue [d]iligence;” and “(9) 
[s]hared [t]echnology [i]ssues.”180  Although these threats are not unique 
to the cloud, they demonstrate that lawyers do not avoid security issues 
when using the cloud any more than they do with their own in-house 
computing services. 
 
VII.  LAWYERS’ USE OF E-MAIL, CLOUD COMPUTING, AND 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
[81] Given the security challenges to confidential information sent 
through e-mails or stored with public cloud providers, lawyers should 
exercise greater care using these technologies than they have done in the 
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 See id. at 219–21. 
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 Bostick, supra note 140, at 1380. 
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 Id. at 1395–96 (citing Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, 
Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 359, 372 (2010)). 
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 CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE, THE NOTORIOUS NINE: CLOUD COMPUTING TOP 
THREATS IN 2013 6–7 (2013), available at 
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past.  Although ethics bodies have approved the use of both e-mail and 
cloud computing, they have done so with the important proviso that 
lawyers must reassess the propriety of using the technologies as both the 
technology and security risks continue to evolve.  What may have been 
“reasonable” security in the past may no longer be adequate.  Given risks 
of exposure of confidential documents and e-mails—as exemplified by the 
SPE breach—lawyers should consider whether it is appropriate to entrust 
highly confidential client information to unencrypted e-mail and cloud 
services. 
 
[82] Although encryption is increasingly inexpensive and is used in 
many businesses, it is not yet widely used by lawyers.
 181
  But as lawyers 
come to understand the inherent security risks in e-mail and in cloud 
computing, they should consider using encryption, particularly for e-mails 
and documents containing sensitive information, such as client 
confidential documents and protected health information under HIPAA.
182
  
 
[83] Like their clients, lawyers must put their own houses in order by 
implementing security measures and incident responses plans for security 
incidents and their aftermath.
183
  A key aspect of security preparedness is 
training law firm personnel, including lawyers themselves.  Even senior 
partners are not immune to phishing attacks and misuse of public 
document sharing sitessuch as Dropbox or Boxwhich are “built to 
handle consumer data, with no true security safeguards, no ability to audit, 
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and no redundancy or backups.”184 
 
[84] Law firms should also assess whether they need to put into place 
policies and procedures prohibiting certain practices that increase the 
danger of dissemination of confidential information.  These policies may 
encompass topics such as using public cloud providers or file sharing 
services for sharing documents, the use of web-based e-mail services, and 
use of public cloud computing providers for sensitive documents.  Instead 
of using public cloud services, lawyers might use “enterprise-grade file 
sharing services that focus on the security and protections designed with 
law firms in mind.”185  As earlier noted, if lawyers do use public storage or 
file sharing services, they should consider using encryption for 
confidential or proprietary documents.
186
 
 
[85] Given recent ethical opinions, it is clear that lawyers must also 
continue to keep abreast of security risks posed by technology to fulfill 
their duties of competence and confidentiality.  Although not every lawyer 
must be a specialist in technology, the days when some in the profession 
could afford to be technophobes are over.  Like their clients, lawyers share 
the burden of preserving sensitive and proprietary data against attacks and 
unauthorized exposure. 
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